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In strictly regular economies limited arbitrage is sufficient for the global invert-
ibility of demand, and necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of equilibrium.
This result is established using algebraic topology and holds in economies with short
sales, and with finitely or infinitely many markets.
1 Introduction
Limited arbitrage is a unifying condition for resource allocation. Defined on the endow-
ments and the preferences of a market's traders, it is necessary as well as sufficient for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium, for a nonempty core and for the existence of de-
sirable social choice rules.1 This paper analyzes the connection between limited arbitrage
and unique market equilibrium. I study a class of strictly regular economies, which are
characterized by strictly convex preferences2 and a demand with a nonvanishing Jacobian
on its domain. Strictly regularity is a stringent condition, but it is simple and easy to
verify. Within this class of economies limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for
uniqueness of market equilibrium.
The results presented here encompass economies with short sales and with infinitely
many markets, which were neglected in the literature on uniqueness of equilibrium. The
excess demand function need not be well defined at all prices.
How does limited arbitrage work? As already pointed out, limited arbitrage is nec-
essary for existence of equilibrium. The necessity part of the results presented here is
therefore clear. The sufficiency derives from a new result, an application of [10]. I show
that in strictly regular economies with limited arbitrage the excess demand function is a
proper map with a nonempty and contractible image. From this, using algebraic topol-
ogy, I show that the excess demand is globally invertible and, in particular, there exists a
unique equilibrium.
The conditions presented here are binding. If the economy is not strictly regular,
then limited arbitrage does not imply unique equilibrium.3 Strict regularity does not by
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 The results also hold for preferences whose indifferences contain no half lines, which are more general
than strictly convex preferences.
3
 Consider for example a two trader economy where both trades have identical linear preferences. This
economy satisfies limited arbitrage but it is not strictly regular because preferences are not strictly convex,
and it has infinitely many equilibria allocations.
itself ensure uniqueness unless the excess demand is a proper map with a nonempty and
contractible image, conditions which are derived here from limited arbitrage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains definitions, Section 3 the main
results and Section 4 discusses related literature. An Appendix provides the topological
background.
2 Definitions
An market E = {X,Qh,Uh,h = 1,..., H} has H > 2 traders, and trading space X = RN~I~1,
with N > 1, or X = Z2,4 the space of square summable sequences of real numbers with
a finite measure. Trader h has a preference represented by a continuous, strictly concave
increasing function u^ : X —-»• R.5 For trader h define the global cone of directions where
utility never ceases to increase, introduced in [7], [4] and [3]:
Gh{Qh) — {% £ X and ~ 3maxu/ l(Jl/ l -i-fix)}, (1)
and its market cone
, (z,y) > 0} (2)
Dh(Qh) is the convex cone of prices assigning strictly positive value to all directions in
Gh(Qh)- Both cones are the same for all Clh € X under the assumptions; when preferences
are strictly convex in RN, the cone Dh is open and convex for each h, see [3], [7], [8], and
in I2 we assume that Dh. is open and convex as well.6 Good 1 is the numeraire; to ensure
its desirability I assume:
Desirability condition: for all h, the vector (1,0, ...,0,...) is in G£(fi&).7




By construction, the excess demand function Z^ of each trader h is defined only on the
set D: I assume these functions are smooth on D, a condition which is trivially satisfied
if D is empty. Observe that the desirability condition implies that Vp G D, its first
coordinate p\ 7^  0. Since by Walras Law Vp G D,(p,Z(p)) = 0, to identify a market
equilibrium it suffices to find a zero of the composition map TT O (^2h=1 Z^) '• D —• RN~l,
where n : RN —•> RN~* is the projection map on the N — 1 coordinates other than 1.
Similarly in the infinite dimensional case TT O (^2h=1 Zh) '• D —• I2, where IT : I2 —* h-8
This composition map is called from now on the excess demand of the economy, and is
denoted Z : D —* X. A competitive equilibrium p* is a zero of the excess demand
Ys ' ° - X - 1 } -
0
 Increasing means that u(x) > u(y) if x > y, and u(x) > u(y) if x >> y. Preferences need not be
strictly increasing coordinatewise. If x,y £ RN, x > y <$• Vi Xi > y±, x > y <$ x > y and for some
i, n > j/j, and x >> y <=> Vt, x» > y .^
6
 Since the positive orthant in I2 has empty interior, this implies that not all vectors in D^ are positive.
Alternatively one can require the cone condition introduced by Chichilnisky and Kalman in 1980 [14] and
renamed properness later, see also Le Van [17].
7G°h(Slh) is the interior of Gh(nh).
8
 As is well known, when the vector Z(p) has all but one coordinate equal to zero, then Z(p) is the
zero vector, because Vp € A, (p, Z(p)) = 0.
function i.e. p* G Z 1(0). When preferences are strictly convex, for each equilibrium
price there is only one corresponding equilibrium allocation.
Let M and N be two manifolds of the same dimension.9 A map / : M —> N is globally
invertible when it is one to one and f(M) = N. Given topological spaces X and Y, a
continuous map / : X —> Y is called proper when the inverse image of every compact set
C. f~l{C), is compact. The unit sphere is S = {p G RN : Y.?=V P? = l)- W h e n X = Z2
then 5 = {p G l<i : X ^ i P?^* = 1- The intersection of the set D with 5 is homeomorphic
to10 an open bounded ball in RN or I2 respectively. It suffices to work on this set D C\ S
of prices, which we do from now on. For simplicity we use the same notation D for this.
Definition 2 When X = RN the market E is strictly regular when (a) it has strictly con-
vex preferences and (b) the excess demand Z : D —• X satisfies the desirability condition
and has a nonvanishing Jacobian.
The following defines strict regularity in infinite economies. For the definition of
Frechet derivative see [2].
Definition 3 When X — I2 the market E is strictly regular when (a) it has strictly convex
preferences and (b) the excess demand Z : D —• X satisfies the desirability condition and
its Frechet derivative DZ is invertible with its norm bounded below.11
3 Market Equilibrium
The following result applies to finite or infinite economies:
Theorem 1 Under limited arbitrage, the excess demand function Z : D —•> X of a strictly
regular economy is a proper map which it is globally invertible.
Proof. Observe that if pi —> (l,0...,0,...) then for trader h all the coordinates of the
trader's excess demand, except the first, may are bounded. However, if pi —• p G dDh and
p 4^ (1,0, ...,0,...) by the definition of Dh and by the monotonicity and strict convexity
of the utilities some coordinate of trader h's demand other than the first must increase
without bound. The desirability condition ensures that (1,0, ..,0) ^ dDh- Furthermore
p3 —* p G 3D implies pi —• p G dDh for some / i £ {1, ...,H}. Therefore p G dD = > p ^
(1,0,...). Therefore as shown above since preferences are monotonic and strictly convex,
and p G dDh for some h, then ^ - > p € dD => p ^ (1,0,...) => limj^^ || Z(pJ) ||= 00.
The next step is to show that when X = RN the fact that pi -> p G dD =>|| Z(p>) || =
00 implies that the excess demand is proper. In the case X = I2, I will also use the
fact that the Frechet derivative is bounded above zero. Therefore in all cases the excess
demand Z of a strictly regular economy is proper.
First consider the finite dimensional case, Z : D —+ RN. We need to show that
the inverse image of any compact set C in /?Ar,Z~1(C), is compact. The proof is by
contradiction. If Z~l(C) was not compact in D then there would exist a sequence of
points (pi)j=i,2,... C Z~X{C) containing no convergent subsequence in Z~l(C). Since
D C A, D is a bounded subset and since X — RN it is precompact. Therefore this can
9
 Finite or infinite. In the latter case the manifold must be a Banach manifold, for otherwise the inverse
function theorem may not hold. Unless otherwise specified all manifolds are smooth i.e. Ck, with k > 2
connected and without boundary, and all maps are smooth.
10
 I.e. in a one-to-one onto bicontinuous correspondence with an open bounded ball in R or I2
respectively.
1 11. e. 3e > 0 : Vp € D, \\DZ(p)\\ > £. Observe that an economy with strictly convex preferences is
always strictly regular when D is empty.
only happen when p3' —> p G 3D. But in this case, by strict regularity the image is not
bounded, contradicting the assumption that C is compact. This completes the proof for
the finite dimensional case.
Next consider the infinite dimensional case. We need to show that the inverse image
of any compact set C in I2, Z~l(C), is compact. This set is always closed because Z is
continuous. If Z~X{C) was not compact in D then there would exist a sequence of points
iv3') 3=1,2.... C Z~l(C) containing no subsequence with a limit in Z~l(C). Consider now
the image of this sequence, Z{p3)J=i2....- By the compactness of C there is a subsequence,
denoted also Zip3), which has a limiting point y G C. By assumption any sequence in its
inverse image zJ G Z~l(Z(pJ) does not converge. This may occur when z3 —• dD\ however
as seen in the first part of this proof, by the hypothesis of this theorem we would have
a contradiction with the assumption that C is compact. Therefore z3 does not converge
to 3D. In this infinite dimensional case another possibility arises: the sequence zJ may
not converge because although Z~X{C) is closed and bounded, it is not compact. Indeed,
closed bounded sets in I2 are generally not compact.
However, the sequence zJ is bounded and contained in a closed set. Therefore it can
only fail to have a limit when z3 is not Cauchy:12 if it is a Cauchy sequence, by the
completeness of I2, it would have a limit because Z is continuous so that Z~1(Z(pJ)) is
closed. Therefore z3 is not Cauchy, i.e. 3e > 0 : Wn,m > N \\zn — zm\\ > s. However by
the assumption on DZ, this implies that Z^p3) is not Cauchy either, which contradicts
the fact that Zip3) —• p. Since the contradiction emerges from assuming that Z is not
proper, Z must be proper. I have therefore shown that in all cases, Z is a proper map.
Observe that when D is empty, then the map Z is trivially proper since the empty set is
compact. Therefore strict regularity by itself does not imply that the excess demand is
invertible.
The next step is to show that under limited arbitrage the excess demand function
Z : D —> X is globally invertible.
Under limited arbitrage D / 0 and the image Z(D) is non-empty. Furthermore,
since the economy is strictly regular, by the inverse function theorem in the Appendix,
the image Z(D) is an open set. Next I will show that properness of Z implies that the
image of Z,Z(D), is closed as well. Let z = limn^oozn where Vn, zn G Z(D). The se-
quence (zn) is compact in Z(D). As shown above, the map Z is proper. By properness,
Z~1{(zn)n=iy2...} = (pn)n=i,2...is a compact set, so that it contains a convergent subse-
quence denoted also (pn), pn —* p G Z~l{(zn)n=i2...}- By continuity Z(p) = z, so that
Z(D) is a closed set. The set D and its image of Z(D) are non empty by limited arbitrage.
Since it is both closed and open in X and it is not the empty set, then Z(D) = X.
The next step is to show that Z is a covering map for X. Under the hypothesis by the
inverse function theorem if Z(x) = y there exists neighborhoods Ux and Uy of x and y
respectively, such that the restriction of the map Z on Ux, Z/Ux : Ux —> Uy, is one-to-one
and onto. By the continuity of the map Z , for any y G X the set Z~1(y) is closed;
since y is compact, the set Z~l(y) is also compact and by the inverse function theorem
in the Appendix, it is O-dimensional. Therefore for any y G X, the set Z~x(y) consists
of finitely many points. We may then choose a neighborhood Uy of y such that Z~1{Uy)
consists of a union of disjoint neighborhoods each diffeomorphic to Uy, i.e. Z~1(t/J,) =
Uxgz-i^j^x}- This implies that Z is a covering map from D onto X.
Now I show that Z is globally invertible. We know by Theorem 5 in the Appendix that
for each subgroup H of ^\{X) there exists a covering 9 : X —• X, which is unique up to
12
 A sequence ar-' is Cauchy if Ve > 037V(e) : n > N,m > M =>• ||xn - xm | | < e. In complete spaces, a
Cauchy sequence always has a limit within a closed set; both R and I2 are complete spaces.
equivalence, such that 9*(-K\(X)) = H. Now observe that H = it\{X) = 0.13 There exists
a standard map i : D —> X which defines a covering of X such that z»(7T1(D)) = TTi(X).
We already saw that Z : D —> X is a covering map, so that Z* : ^ ( D ) —• TTI(X) is a
monomorphism by Theorem 3 in the Appendix. By limited arbitrage D ^ 0 and under
the conditions it is a convex set, so that its image X under the excess demand function
is non-empty and contractible, in particular fti(X) = 0. Since the first homotopy group
71"! (A') is zero. Zt is onto, so that Z»(TT1(D)) = TT1(X). Therefore both maps Z and i
satisfy Zt(iri(D)) — u(7T1(D)) = TTI(X); it follows from Theorem 5 in the Appendix that
Z and i define equivalent coverings. Since i is a one-fold covering of X, then Z is a globally
invertible map as we wished to prove. H
Theorem 2 Let E be a strictly regular economy. Then E has limited arbitrage if and
only if it has a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Sufficiency first. The global invertibility of Z established in Theorem 1 above
implies that there exists a unique equilibrium when the economy has limited arbitrage.
The necessity follows from Theorem 1 of [7] and its infinite dimensional counterpart in
[12]: if limited arbitrage is not satisfied then a competitive equilibrium does not exist.14 I
4 Related literature on unique equilibrium
The results presented here apply only to strictly regular economies, but they encompass
economies where the demand function may not be well defined at some prices, where
short sales are allowed, and include finite or infinite dimensional markets. The existing
literature concentrates instead on finite dimensional markets without short sales.
In finite economies without short sales the closest to Theorem 2 above is Theorem
15 on p. 236 of Arrow and Hahn [1] whose proof is connected to the convergence to
equilibrium of the global Newton method. Arrow and Hahn [1] do not cover short sales,
nor economies where the demand is only defined for some prices or infinite dimensional
cases.
Working also on finite economies without short sales Dierker [15] assumes a desirabil-
ity condition which is related but different from that required here, and uses an index
argument to show the uniqueness of equilibrium. His conditions and results are differ-
ent: I assume that the Jacobian never vanishes in the interior of D, a subset of the price
space, while [15] assumes that there is a price adjustment system which is stable at each
equilibrium, or more generally that the Jacobian of the system has the same sign at each
equilibrium. The result obtained here is stronger than those in [15]: I prove the global
invertibility of the map Z and hence uniqueness of equilibrium while [15] proves that the
equilibrium is unique.
The results presented here are also of a different nature from other global invertibility
results for finite economies, such as the Gale-Nikaido theorem, which apply to maps
defined on closed cubes and require a nonvanishing Jacobian on the interior of the cube
as well as similar conditions on the boundary of the cube. I only require conditions on a
convex open subset D C A. Since limited arbitrage eliminates boundary equilibrium, so
there is no need to study the boundary of the price space.
13
 A topological space X is contractible when there exists a continuous map F : X X [0,1] —• X and
x° e X such that Va; G X, F(x,0) — x, and F(x, 1) = x°. A contractible space has a zero fundamental
group, ni(X) = 0. RN and h are linear spaces and therefore contractible.
14
 For a proof that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equi-
librium see also [4],[6], [7], [9].
5 Appendix
The following concepts and results of algebraic topology can be found in Greenberg [16].
Given two topological spaces,15 X and F , X is a covering space of Y if there exists a
continuous onto map 9 : X —• Y such that each y G Y has a neighborhood Uy whose
inverse image 9~1(Uy) is the disjoint union of sets in X each of which is homeomorphic
to Uy. The map 9 is called a covering map. When the inverse image 9~l(y) of each point
y £ Y contains exactly k > 1 points, then the covering is called ah — fold covering.
The first homotopy group of X, also called its fundamental group, is denoted 7T1(X).Two
covering spaces p : X —• Y and p' : X' —> Y are equivalent when there is a unique
homeomorphism <Z> : X —>• X' such that p o 0 = p'.
Theorem 3 Let p : X —>• F be a covering map. Then p* : K\(X) —> K\(Y) is one-to-one
group homomorphism, i.e. a monomorphism. See [16], p. 19..
Theorem 4 Any manifold M has a covering space p : X —* M with K\{X) = 0, called
its 'universal' covering space. See [16], p. 23, (6.7).
Theorem 5 Let p : X —>• Y be a covering space. For any subgroup H of K\(Y) there
exists a covering space p : X —>• y unique up to an equivalence, such that H = p,iri(X).
See [16], p. 24, (6.9).
Theorem 6 Inverse Function Theorem [2]. Let M and N be two manifolds of the same
dimension, f : M —• N a smooth map, andy = f{x). If the Jacobian of f is non vanishing
at x there exists neighborhoods Ux and Uy of x and y respectively, such that f/Ux : Ux —>•
Uy is a diffeomorphism.16 If M is a Banach manifold then the same result holds when f
has an invertible Frechet derivative at x.
References
[l] Arrow, K. and F. Hahn General Competitive Analysis, North Holland, Amsterdam,
New York and Tokyo, Fourth printing, 1986.
[2] Abraham, R. and J. Robbin Transversal Mappings and Flows, W.A. Benjamin, New
York and Amsterdam, 1967.
[3] Chichilnisky, G. (1991) "Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choices" Paper presented at
the Conference "Columbia Celebrates Arrow's Contributions" Columbia University
New York October 27, 1991, CORE Discussion Paper No. 9342, CORE, Universite
Catolique de Louvain, Lou vain la Neuve, Belgium, 1993.
[4] Chichilnisky, Graciela (1992) "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the
Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium" Columbia University Discussion Paper No.
650, December 1992.
[5] Chichilnisky, Graciela (1994) "Social Diversity and Gains from Trade: A Unified
Perspective on Resource Allocation" American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceedings, May 1994, No. 4, p. 427-434.
15
 All topological spaces are assumed to be connected and locally path connected.
A diffeomorphism is a one-to-one onto map which is smooth and has a smooth inverse.
[6] Chichilnisky, G. (1994) "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Non-
emptiness of the Core", Economic Letters, September 1996, previously in an issue
reprinted without the paper, "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the
Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium and the Core and Limits Voting Cycles"
Economic Letters, December 1994.
[7] Chichilnisky.G. (1995) "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Exis-
tence of a Competitive Equilibrium With or Without Short Sales" Economic Theory,
Vol. 5. No. 1, p. 79-108, January 1995.
[8] Chichilnisky, G. (1995) "A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Ar-
bitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium,
the Core and Social Choice" CORE Discussion Paper No. 9527.
[9] Chichilnisky, G. (1996) "A Topological Invariant for Competitive Markets" Working
Paper Columbia University May 1996, to appear in Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics.
[10] Chichilnisky, G. (1996) "Topology and Invertible Maps" Working Paper, Columbia
University May 1996, revised June 1996.
[11] Chichilnisky, G. (1996) "Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Exis-
tence of a Competitive Equilibrium" Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcom-
ing.
[12] Chichilnisky, G. and G. Heal (1992) "Arbitrage and Equilibrium with Infinitely Many
Securities and Commodities" Discussion Paper Series No. 618, Columbia University
Department of Economics, July 1992, revised 1996, forthcoming in Economic Theory.
[13] Chichilnisky, G. and G. Heal (1984) "Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium in
Sobolev Spaces without Bounds on Short Sales" Journal of Economic Theory, 1993,
Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 68-87.
[14] Chichilnisky, G. and P. Kalman (1980) "Applcation of functional analysis to models
of efficient allocation of economic resources" Journal of Optimization Theory and
Applications 30, 19-32, 1980.
[15] Dierker, E. "Two Remarks on the Number of Equilibria of an Economy" Economet-
rica, Vol. 40, No 5, September 1972, p. 951-955.
[16] Greenberg, M. J. Lectures on Algebraic Topology, Mathematics Lecture Note Series,
WT.A. Benjamin, Inc. Reading, Massachusets, 1967.
[17] Le Van, C. "Complete characterization of Yannelis-Zame and Chichilnisky-Kalman-
Mas-Colell properness conditions on preferences for separable concave functions de-
fined on Lp+ and L?" Economic Theory, 8, No. 1, 155-176, 1996.
1995-96 Discussion Paper Series
9596-01 Protectionist Response to Import Competition in Declining Industries by: J. Choi
Reconsidered
9596-02 New Estimates on Climate Demand: Evidence from Location Choice by: M. Cragg
M. Kahn
9596-03 Enforcement by Hearing
9596-04 Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or
Foes?
9596-05 Simplification, Progression and a Level Playing Field
9596-06 The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation
9596-07 Market Structure and the Timing of Technology Adoption
9596-08 The Emergence of the World Economy
9596-09 The Global Age: From a Skeptical South to a Fearful North
9596-10 A Conformity Test for Cointegration
9596-11 Identification and Kullback Information in the GLSEM
9596-12 Informational Leverage and the Endogenous Timing of Product
Introductions
9596-13 Changes in Wage Inequality
9596-14 The Design of Monte Carlo Experiments for VAR Models
9596-15 A Topological Invariant for Competitive Markets
9596-16 Topology and Invertible Maps


















1995-96 Discussion Paper Series
9596-18 Measuring Neighborhood Investments: Urban Quality of Life by: D. Dipasquale
Expenditures by Race j
9596-19 The Silver Lining of Industrial Decline: Rust Belt Manufacturing's by: M. Kahn
Impact on Particulates
9596-20 Education's Role in Explaining Diabetic Health Investment Differentials by: M. Kahn
9596-21 Limited Arbitrage and Uniqueness of Market Equilibrium by: G. Chichilnisky
